Microfinance institutions serve a majority of female borrowers. But do men and women benefit from same credit conditions? This paper investigates this issue by presenting an original model and testing its predictions on an exceptional database including 34,000 loan applications from a Brazilian microfinance institution over an eleven-year period. The model considers a lender that offers standardized loan contracts with a fixed interest rate, which is common practice in microfinance. It demonstrates that biased loan attribution may lead to three different outcomes, depending on the bias intensity: 1) denial of all applications from a given group, 2) a "glass ceiling" effect, namely loan downsizing of the largest projects from a given group, or 3) no impact. The empirical analysis detects no gender bias in approval rate, but uncovers a glass ceiling effect hurting female applicants. Moreover, this effect is insensitive to the credit officer's gender. In conclusion, the good news is that the microfinance practice does ensure a fair access to credit. The bad news is the presence of a glass ceiling faced by female entrepreneurs with larger projects. 
It is one of the injustices of the way that society is organized in Bangladesh that extremely able women, even those from better-o households, are unable to realize their entrepreneurial potential because their gender acts as a barrier to gaining access to the necessary resources. Men, even poor men, have always had more choices in terms of accessing economic opportunities than women from an equivalent class Kabeer (2001) (p. 83) 1 Introduction Micronance institutions (MFIs) oer tiny loans to poor entrepreneurs, among which a majority of women (according to Daley-Harris (2009) , in 2007 more than 70% of MFIs' clients were women 1 ). While this evidence is widely acknowledged in the literature (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) , few papers examine whether male and female borrowers benet from same credit conditions. This paper investigates this issue by proposing both a novel conceptual framework and an empirical analysis based on an exceptional database encompassing 34,000 loan applications from a Brazilian MFI.
Because of its focus on women, common wisdom views micronance as some sort of spontaneous armative action. Nevertheless, things are less obvious than they look. Indeed, the fact that women benet from smaller loans than men might be due to dierent causes. On the one hand, women in developing countries are poorer than men, 2 and their entrepreneurial projects have smaller scope. On the other hand, as observed by, e.g., Storey (2004) and Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli (2008) , smaller loans could result from biased loan granting.
3 This paper aims to clarify this question by comparing loan attribution to male and female applicants with similar creditworthiness characteristics.
The issue at stake relates to two dierent streams of literature dealing with women empowerment in micronance, and discrimination in lending, respectively. Firstly, the link between micronance and women empowerment has been thoroughly examined. Several authors have acknowledged the merits of micronance on increasing women's bargaining power and social capital (Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006) . However, in line with Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) , recent studies on intrahousehold relations in India (Garikipati, 2008; ) have chal-1 This rate reaches more than 80% for poorest clients.
2 According to ILO (2009) , 75% of poverty worldwide is female.
3 Mayoux (2002) mentions the danger of ghetto-ising women within small loan programmes.
lenged the impact of micronance on women empowerment by exhibiting that lending to women may increase their nancial vulnerability. Trying to reconcile both views, Kabeer (2001) observes that the positive evaluations focus on access to credit while the negative ones focus on loan use. She concludes by emphasizing that the reasons for lending to women go far beyond empowerment. Scrutinizing the sector's lending practices may thus bring valuable insights to this lively debate.
Secondly, because of legal requirements, 4 discrimination in lending has been scrutinized mainly in US mortgage lending (Munnell et al., 1996; Turner and Skidmore, 1999; Han, 2004) and small business credit industry (Blanchower, Levine and Zimmerman, 2003; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005) . In mortgage lending, evidence shows that black applicants face the worst denial rate (Schafer and Ladd, 1982; Ross, 2000) while female applicants are subject to disparate treatment (Ladd, 1998) . Rening the existing econometric methodology, Blanchard, Zhao and Yinger (2008) also nd evidence of credit discrimination against black-owned and Hispanicowned businesses, but not against white women. However, these authors do not separate black and Hispanic women from men, which makes it dicult to globally assess discrimination against female applicants. Stereotypes thus seem to survive the enforcement of the US Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
Outside the US, discrimination in lending has been scarcely studied. Storey (2004) shows that, in Trinidad and Tobago, loan applications from Afrodescendant small-business owners are more likely to be denied than others.
A study on Italian microrms and self-employed individuals by Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli (2008) emphasizes that women pay higher interest rates although they exhibit a slightly better credit history. Additional evidence on gender discrimination in Italian small business lending is provided by Bellucci, Borisov and Zazzaro (2009) . Buvinic and Berger (1990) and Fletschner (2009) show that women keep being more credit-rationed than men by MFIs.
Importantly, the notion of discrimination in lending considered here is purely taste-based (Becker, 1971 ) and independent from any economic motivation.
As social psychologists claim (Fein and Spencer, 1997; Kunda and Sinclair, 4 The US legal framework against discrimination in lending notably includes the Fair housing Act of 1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975. In 1989, the Congress amended the former HMDA and imposed to lenders to report the race and ethnicity of their loan applicants.
Wide disparities in the loan denial rates were subsequently exhibited by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank using the HMDA database. Based on denial rates, Munnell et al. (1996) show that ethnic minorities (African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans) were facing much larger loan rejection rates than white applicants with similar creditworthiness. 3 1999), stereotyping and prejudice are common features in human behavior.
Our rst contribution is theoretical. It draws upon the specic microcredit lending methodology. Typically, to keep their costs low MFIs oer standardized loan contracts with a xed interest rate, and hence use a credit rationing methodology (Morduch, 1999 ). In our model, loans are granted by a possibly biased lender who oers xed interest loans and tailors loan size to the applicant's perceived creditworthiness. In this context, Beckerian discrimination (Becker, 1971 ) may lead to three dierent outcomes, depending on the intensity of the lender's bias: 1) denial of all applications from the discriminated-against group, 2) a glass ceiling (Kanter, 1993) , i.e., a gap hurting the largest projects from the discriminated-against group, and 3) no impact.
Our second contribution consists in empirical assessment based on unique data provided by a Brazilian micronance institution, encompassing 34,000 loan applications over an eleven-year period. To our best knowledge, this paper is the rst one to export the discrimination-in-lending approach to micronance. Moreover, as the database includes not only all applicants' characteristics used as screening devices by credit ocers, but also the amount requested by each loan applicant, partial-least-square estimation is used to avoid multicollinearity.
The estimation results are threefold. Firstly, we detect no discriminatory practice in the approval rate, but uncover a gender gap in loan size. Under similar circumstances, women face harsher loan conditions than men. Secondly, we conrm the presence of a glass ceiling eect, namely largest female projects face the highest penalty. Lastly, we show that these ndings are insensitive to the credit ocer's gender.
In conclusion, the good news is that the microcredit practice does indeed ensure a fair access to credit, which is an exceptional achievement given the persistence of discrimination in lending in developed countries. The bad news is the existence of a glass ceiling endured by the most ambitious female entrepreneurs. Therefore, our results are consistent with the mitigated conclusions reached in the literature on women empowerment through micronance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the database. Section 4 investigates the impact of gender on loan approval and loan size, taking into account a large spectrum of control variables. The presence of a glass ceiling in loan size is examined in section 5. Section 6 scrutinizes loan size determination by male and female credit ocers separately. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The pool of loan applicants is denoted by P . Each applicant,(x, g) ∈ P , is characterized by two independent variables: creditworthiness, x ∈ X, and group identity,g ∈ {F, M }.
The risk-neutral MFI delegates screening and loan allocation to a credit ofcer who is possibly biased against applicants from group F. As the model formalizes taste-based discrimination, not statistical discrimination, the information is symmetric, at least at the credit ocer's level.
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The model has one period and all loans are oered with the same interest rate 6 r. At time 0, the credit ocer receives a loan request from applicant (x, g), and subsequently allocates a loan of size B = B(x, g) (equal to zero, in case of denial) by maximizing expected prot,E [W (x, g)], which equals expected future reimbursement minus costs.
The costs include the MFI's cost of capital r 0 < r, and the agent's psychological cost associated to serving F applicants: δ(g), with δ(M ) = 0 and δ(F ) = δ ∈ [0, 1]. The credit ocer's maximization problem reads:
where R(B, x) is the stochastic gender-independent reimbursement from borrower (x, g) for a loan of size B, and E[.] represents the expectation operator. Given the objective function in equation (1), applicant (x, F ) is likely to receive a smaller loan than applicant (x, M ) in order to compensate for the cost penalty resulting from the ocer's bias.
At time 1, the client reimburses according to his/her current business revenue.
We assume the existence of a penalty suciently high to deter strategic default 7 . The revenue in period 1, denoted by y, is stochastic. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that only two values are possible for y, depending on the state of the nature: a low value, y, and a high value, y. Borrower(x, g) is characterized by probability π(x) to generate the low value y in the following 5 At the MFI level (not considered in the model), information asymmetry is more likely given that MFIs are highly decentralized. Discriminatory practice could then remain undetected by the MFI's stakeholders who do not observe all clients' characteristics, leading to a typical agency problem.
6 This is a common practice in microcredit institutions.Alternatively, the lending rate could be adjusted to the client's risk characteristics in x, but besides making the model more complicated, this would not aect much the results.
7 Default in Vivacred implies that the client is nationally publicized as a bad risk. y(x, g) = y(x) = y with probability π(x) y with probability 1 − π(x) (2) Importantly, the borrower's reimbursement capacity depends only on creditworthiness, assumed independent from group identity. Therefore, the credit ocer's bias, if any, has no economic origin.
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At time 1, variable y(x) realizes and borrower (x, g) repays R(B, x), that is as much as he/she can, given the situation: ), and stochastic otherwise. 
y). h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h

Revenue y
Loan size B B ≤ y 1+r
The model is solved by backward induction. From table 1, we derive the reimbursement expected at time 0:
Given the borrower's expected reimbursement in (4), the ocer's objective function writes:
8 Parametrizing the clients according to their probability to generate low revenue is a convenient way to make expected reimbursement continuous with respect to creditworthiness. In practice, the loans are reimbursed by installments, which makes the possibility of partial repayment realistic. Indeed, the expected reimbursement,E [R (B, x)], is to be interpreted as the expected present value of all future payments. 
The optimal loan size is thus given by:
As δ(M ) = 0 and r > r 0 , all M applicants receive a loan amounting at least to B. Only F applicants can face denial.
The optimal loan size for an M applicant is given by:
Two situations may occur to F applicants. First, if the bias is so high that δ > r − r 0 , then all F applicants face denial. Second, if δ ≤ r − r 0 , then the ocer's bias acts as an additional probability 10 of low revenue. Let us dene:
Then, the credit ocer's optimal loan size for an F applicant is: 
Discriminatory denial
In fact, all F applicants are not penalized to the same extent. The actual harm depends on the applicant's probability to generate low revenue, π(x), and on the ocer's bias, δ. loan is denied to all F applicants, whatever their creditworthiness. In the middle scenario (case 2), the credit ocer's bias is small enough to avoid discriminatory denial, but high enough to prevent F applicants from getting B. This is the typical glass ceiling situation where loan size equals B for all F applicants, and only F applicants with low π(x)'s are hurt.
As illustrated by gure 1, F applicants may face discrimination whatever their creditworthiness, but the probability is smaller for those with a high π(x) (graph on the right). Indeed, for such borrowers, the credit ocer has only two possibilities: unfair denial or fair loan size,B. In case 2, fair loan size is optimal for the credit ocer.
On the opposite, for F applicants with a low π(x) (graph on the left), the credit ocer has three possibilities: unfair denial, unfair loan size,B, or fair loan size,B. Now, in case 2, the credit ocer's optimal loan size is B, resulting in a discriminatory gap. Therefore, biased ocers are particularly detrimental to their MFI as they downsize the loans provided to the most protable F applicants.
In summary, high bias against F applicants leads to denial as the credit ocer's psychological cost is too high to be compensated by expected prof-10 Actually, this number is not a probability anymore, as it may exceed one. its. When the bias is less pronounced, a trade-o appears between expected prots and the credit ocer's psychological cost. As this cost is proportional to loan size, it hurts particularly more protable applicants. Moreover, the glass ceiling eect appears when all F applicants end up with loan size B.
In that situation, no increase in creditworthiness will ever make it possible for an F applicant to reach the higher loan size, B, which therefore remains reserved to M applicants.
This result contradicts the argument by Zycher and Wolfe (1994) stating that there is more room for lending discretion in the gray area where the applicant's creditworthiness is not well established (in our model, this gray area corresponds to: π(x) r−r 0 1+r
). This dierence is due to the fact that our model imposes no penalty to rogue agents, which is in line with the current practice. Although incentive schemes are becoming common in MFIs (McKim and Hughart, 2005) , no penalty for discriminatory behavior has, to our knowledge, ever been enforced.
Biased loan granting is thus detrimental not only to the applicants who suer from discrimination, but also to the lending institution that misses prot opportunities because of its agent's bias. In micronance though, no systematic investigation for biased loan allocation has been put in place yet, and there exists no regulation on that matter. However, the social orientation of most
MFIs could act as a natural prevention mechanism to deter discriminatory practices provided that adequate monitoring instruments and/or incentives are put in place. Indeed, as shown from the survey data 11 reported by Labie et al. (2010) , credit ocers tend to be more biased than other MFI's employees. Unfortunately, Labie et al. (2010) also emphasize that due to cost issues, internal governance mechanisms may fall short in fully eliminating discrimination. Therefore, there is room for external actors, like donors and regulatory authorities, to come up with an anti-discrimination agenda. But before drawing policy recommendation, a careful assessment of the facts is needed.
Data
Our unique database comes from Vivacred, a non-prot microcredit institution operating in Rio de Janeiro'sfavelas, for the period 1997-2007 (11 years).
Vivacred provides credit to tiny and small rms located in Rio's low-income communities and neighborhoods. It focuses on urban (formal and informal)
micro-businesses such as storekeepers, craftspersons, and service providers.
Vivacred started its activity in 1996 in Rocinha, the largest favela in Rio. The typical loan proposed by Vivacred has a xed monthly interest rate of 3.9% 12 and an additional one-shot registration fee (from 3 to5%) depending of the credit duration and the client's repayment history.
The dataset used in this paper contains not only the actual loan contracts, but also all applications details presented to the committee (approved or denied). For the period under consideration (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , about 41,000 loans 11 The survey is about the treatment of the disabled by Ugandese MFIs.
12 While this rate looks very high at rst sight, it has to be understood in the Brazilian context. Over the period 1997-2007, the central bank key interest rate (celic) was between 0.89% and 2.58% a month (between 11.18% and 35.76% a year). During the same period,
Banco da Mulher, a comparable non-prot institution, was oering rates between 3% and 5% a month, and Fininvest, a for-prot institution, was oering consumption loans with rates reaching 12% a month. In 2008, Vivacred was funded by BNDES (Brazilian Bank of Development) at an annual rate of 7.5% (this rate was even higher during the period 1997-2007).
were solicited by 15,400 applicants, and about 32,000 loans were granted to 11,400 borrowers. Our database includes all pieces of information gathered by the six branches of Vivacred. However, we removed from the data set the applications canceled by the clients, the contracts with incomplete specications, the loans to Vivacred's employees, and the few group loans.
Therefore, the study is based on exhaustive data of 34,000 applications and 32,000 actual loans. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of average loan size in nominal and deated 13 More precisely, the information available for all clients includes: private and professional addresses, birth date, birth state, marital status, gender, dependent(s), profession, bank references, partner's ID, current account, family consumption, family external income, full credit history (as a borrower, a borrower's partner, or a guarantor). Unfortunately, the Vivacred database does not contain racial information. Actually, because of miscegenation, racial segmentation is dicult in Brazil (Sheri, 2000) . The region of origin, provided for about two-thirds of Vivacred's clients, could be taken as an imperfect proxy for race (colored people are more concentrated in northern regions). We decided to discard this imprecise information in order not to lose observations. 14 Namely: location, type of activity, age, bank references, legal status, detailed assets and liabilities, expenditure and revenues, and number of employees. Vivacred claims no special focus on serving women. Table 3 shows that its clientele is balanced with 49.6% of loans attributed to women over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Figure 4 shows that the proportion of female applicants steadily 19 Here, we focus on gender. Besides, given the special interest of MFIs in female borrowers, we draw no prior hypothesis regarding the potential bias, so allowing for detecting armative action (bias in favor of female applicants) as well as gender stereotyping (bias in favor of male applicants). all other things being equal, applicants from group F are facing more severe loan approval than others.
However, the decision to be taken by microcredit ocers goes beyond loan approval or denial. In case of approval, loan size is also part of this decision.
Indeed, unlike mortgage loans, productive loans can easily be sized by the lender. Therefore, the amount requested by each applicant is a relevant piece of information. Fortunately, our wealthy database includes all applicants'
requests. These data make it possible to determine the extent to which gender-specic outcomes, if any, are attributable to gender-specic requests.
The use of the applicants' requested amount is not standard in the literature, likely because of data availability issues. However, introducing requested amount as an explanatory variable might bring multicollinearity. Therefore, our estimation strategy will depart from the classical approach. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst one to use partial least square (PLS) estimation to test for discrimination in lending, as explained below.
Our theoretical model has shown that discriminated-against group members can suer from excess credit rationing in two dierent ways: unfair loan denial, or unfair loan downsizing (with respect to same-creditworthiness non-discriminated-against group members). In that line, the empirical investigation starts with testing for gender dierences in credit approval and loan size. The evolution of the gender gap along the project scale is left for the next section.
For the approval probability (A i = 1 if applicant i gets a loan, A i = 0 otherwise), we specify the following probit model:
where Φ(.) represents the normal probability distribution, F i is the gender dummy (F i = 1 if applicant i is a woman, F i = 0 otherwise), RA i is the amount requested by applicant i, X i 20 is the vector summarizing the J control variables for applicant i. The corresponding coecients are b F , b R , and vector b X , respectively.
The control variables are the ones typically used to assess creditworthiness. A linear specication including the same independent variables is used for explaining the loan size:
where LS i represents the loan size 21 obtained by applicant i. The coecients associated to the explanatory variables are denoted by c F , c R , and vector c X , respectively.
In practice, loan size determination results from a sequential process: First, the applicant makes a loan request RA i , then the MFI oers a loan of size LS i . As shown in table 3, the requested amount is gender-sensitive. Women request on average BRL 1, 254, while men request on average BRL 1, 526 22 .
In order to properly address this issue, we implement a PLS estimation procedure (Wold et al., 1984; Tenenhaus, 1998; Helland, 1990 ) that rests upon a recursive specication. In the rst step, we regress the requested amount on the gender dummy and the control variables, and determine the residual requested amount, RRA i , that represents the amount requested by applicant i cleaned from gender and controls eects:
The gender dummy in equation (13) is indeed signicant 23 . In the second step, we explain loan approval probability, respectively loan size, by the gender dummy, controls and residual requested amount. The approval probability equation 24 becomes:
21 Denied applications are captured as zero loans.
22 We ignore why female applicants act in this way, and whether they expect a genderspecic treatment from the institution. This question will be raised in the conclusion.
23 A female applicant's request lies on average BRL 107 below the request from a male applicant with similar characteristics. In the raw data (table 3) , the dierence amounted BRL 272.
24 PLS is normally designed for linear regression, but we adapt it here to probit regression. By doing so, we might distort to some extent the marginal eects but the signicance thresholds remain adequate, which is our main concern.
Similarly, the loan size linear model writes:
By combining coecients estimated from (13) and (14), respectively (13) and (15), we isolate the pure eects of requested amount on credit approval and loan size, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Table 4 presents the marginal eects at the mean for the probit regression and the estimated coecients for the loan size regression. In specications
(1) and (4), the requested amount is ignored (b R = 0). Specications (2) and (5) include the requested amount, while specications (3) and (6) include the residual requested amount. In (1) and (2), the coecients are estimated from the standard probit (eq.11). In (3), the PLS-like probit model includes the residual requested amount (eq. 14). In (4) and (5), the coecients are estimated by OLS (eq. 12), in (6) by PLS (eq. 15).
Whatever the specication, no gender dierence is observed in the credit approval probability. This result conrms the similarity in approval rate between men and women uncovered in descriptive statistics (table 3) .
The impact of gender on loan size sharply contrasts with the gender neutrality observed on approval rate. Indeed, in the right-hand side of table 4 all specications exhibit signicantly negative coecients for the gender dummy, meaning that, all other things being equal (including the requested amount), women get smaller loans than men.
Moreover, the comparison of (4) and (5) highlights the dierence in coecient magnitudes. In specication (4), the female dummy coecient is equal to (−93.45), while in (5) it reaches (−32.43). Thus, women do indeed get smaller loans, but largely because, under similar circumstances, they ask for smaller loans than men. Specication (6) explicitly takes into account the requested amount cleaned from its female component. While the gender dummy coecient estimates have identical values in (4) and (6), specication (6) oers more precision (smaller standard error) and more explanatory power (larger R 2 ).
To sum up, the results show that credit approval is not aected by the applicant's gender, but loan size determination is detrimental to female borrowers.
As a consequence, the estimations clearly exclude the situation referred to as case 1 (loan denial to a given group) in our theoretical model. However, the specications used in this section fall short in detecting a gender gap varying with the project scale, like in case 2 (glass ceiling eect). Better suited specications are proposed in the next section.
Is there a Glass Ceiling in Loan Size ?
The theory in section 2 has demonstrated that biased credit ocers exhibit heterogeneous impact, leading to the possibility for a glass ceiling eect. By glass ceiling eect, we mean that women with large expected revenue end up with more cut down loans than those with small expected revenues. In order to assess this theoretical prediction, we slighly modify the loan size regression and allow the gender dummy to interact with the project scale.
In specication (15), loan size linearly depends on the requested amount with a common slope for men and women. The interaction between gender and project scale may take various forms. Therefore, we consider two alternative specications for this interaction in the loan size regression: a gender-specic slope and a gender-specic quadratic term, both with respect to the residual requested amount (PLS estimation) .
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The model with a gender-specic slope is :
where LS i is the loan size, F i is the gender dummy (F i = 1 if applicant i is a woman, F i = 0 otherwise), RRA i is the residual requested amount, and 25 OLS regressions produce similar results (not reported).
vector X i summarizes the controls. The possibility for a glass-ceiling eect is provided by parameter c RF .
Importantly, the interaction variable, RRA i F i , is added to the specication already including the gender dummy F i , allowing to split the gender impact in two parts. On the one hand, coecient c F applies to all women, irrespectively of their project size. On the other hand, c RF depends on the project scale. Only a signicantly negative c RF would bear witness to a glass ceiling in loan size.
The second specication includes linear and quadratic residual requested amount, as well as a gender-specic quadratic term allowing for a dierential concavity eect:
Under specication (17), a signicant negative value for c QF would capture the glass-ceiling eect. Moreover, such quadratic eect would be stronger than in equation (16) because it would reect a gender gap that not only increases, but also accelerates with the project scale. Table 5 gives the estimation results for both specications: equation (16) in column (1), and equation (17) In the same vein, column (2) shows that the quadratic size-dependent gender eect is signicantly negative. Compared to men with same characteristics, women with larger projects are more restricted. As the control variables coecients are similar to those found in table 4, we do not report them.
Specications (1) and (2) seems to have a strikingly little impact on the chances of success of femaleowned small businesses (Fischer, Reuber and Dyke, 1993) , perhaps because women make a better use of their social capital . Still, transposing those results to poor micro-entrepreneurs in developing countries is far from obvious.
In equations (16) and (17), the residual requested amount stands as a proxy for the size of the project, corresponding to parameter (1 − π(x)) in the theoretical model. In order to check the robustness of our results with respect to the use of such proxy, we reproduce the estimations using this time the household external income as an alternative proxy for parameter(1 − π(x)).
The results are in table 6.
Compared to columns (1) and (4) At this point, we have conrmed the theoretical prediction that the gender gap in loan size is more severe for larger loans. However, the responsibilities for disparate treatment within the MFI remain unclear. In particular, one could wonder whether the credit ocer's gender matters. This is the topic of the next section.
6 Impact of the Credit Ocer's Gender
In this section, we study whether the credit ocer's gender interferes with the disparate treatment endured by female clients. Such interference could take place because female credit ocers adopt a dierent screening strategy than their male colleagues, and/or because some kind of gender anity makes credit ocers favor or better assess clients of the same gender.
Women are typically more risk averse than men in nancial decision making (Olsen and Cox, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2001; Jianakopolos and Bernasek, 1998) . Moreover, the benecial impact of gender diversity on rm gover-nance and rm value has been largely acknowledged in micronance and elsewhere.
27 Applied to credit ocers, this argument could imply that costecient female ocers mitigate economically unsound biases, whether against women or any other group. For instance, Guérin, Mersland and D'Espallier (2009) show that female ocers increase the odds of serving female clients.
Gender anity, as a special case of cultural anity (Bostic, 2003) , may act in two opposite directions: as an inecient intra-group favoritism 28 (Ahmed, 2007; Szafarz, 2008) , or as an ecient tool for creditworthiness assessment (Carter et al., 2007; Ferguson and Peters, 1997) . Therefore, the eect of gender anity, if any, is not clear-cut.
This section examines how female applicants are treated by female and male credit ocers, separately. For that purpose, we rst compare the loan portfolios of female and male ocers. Then, we run the loan size regressions like in section 5, but splitting the full sample in two by credit ocer's gender. Table 8 compares the characteristics of female and male loan applicants dealing with female and male credit ocers, respectively. Conrming the obser-27 See, e.g., Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) and Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) on the positive impact of diversity (ethnic and gender dierences) on boards. Regarding micronance specically, Hartarska (2005) nds evidence that in Eastern Europe and Central Asian, MFIs with higher proportion of women on their board reach poorer borrowers. Caudill, Gropper and Hartarska (2009) show that US Community Development Funds with more gender diversity on the board are more cost-ecient.
28 Biggs, Raturi and Srivastava (2002) illustrate the occurrence of such anity in informal nance in Kenya. 29 Pearson χ 2 (1) = 33.6798 and P-value = 0.000. This eect is surprising given that, in Vivacred, each credit ocer has a specic geographic area to serve. Nonetheless, it could be the case that female ocers are allocated to areas exhibiting a higher concentration of female businesses. To provide a full picture of the situation, we have tested for the dierence of male and female ocers' in each characteristic (see Leaving aside the applicant's gender impact (discussed below), it appears from table 9 that female and male credit ocers screen their clients differently. Indeed, although the coecients of the regressions pertaining to female and male credit ocers exhibit same sign (except for the constant term), numerous signicant dierences emerge.
Notably, the constant is signicant only in the regressions concerning male credit ocers (columns (2) and (5)), pinpointing that male and female credit ocers do not use the same scales in judging their clients' projects. Male ocers start from a positive benchmark (even for female clients, since the female dummy coecient is smaller than the constant term) while female ocers start from zero, or even below zero for their female applicants.
Compared to their male colleagues, female ocers downweight characteristics testifying for loan securing: external income, business prot, and ocial business. This could be a consequence of a higher risk aversion, leading to granting smaller loans.
Whatever the specication (linear or quadratic), the regressions concerning both the male and female credit ocers do exhibit the glass ceiling stigma.
However, the dierences in scale and in control weighting make the glass ceiling intensities hardly comparable. All in all, the ways female and male credit ocers evaluate their clients' creditworthiness are strikingly dierent but the glass ceiling eect is present whatever the ocer's gender, and robust to model specication 31 .
Conclusion
The theoretical model in section 2 has shown that bias in loan granting with xed interest rate implies that more protable applicants from the group that suers from discrimination end up being the most credit-constrained.
30 In order to capture gender-gaps associated to every credit ocer working at Vivacred, we included interactions between the 40 credit ocers' dummies and the clients' gender dummy. Among the 40 credit ocers, 26 (13 men, and 13 women) exhibit a non signicant coecient (at the 5% level), 11 (5 men, and 6 women) exhibit a biais against female clients, and 3 (1 man, and 2 women) exhibit a biais against male clients.
31 A third specication based on sample splitting with respect to the project scale is provided in Appendix B. It conrms that the presence of a glass ceiling eect in male and female ocers' loan size determination. Gender stereotypes are shared by both male and female ocers.
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The empirical evidence based on highly disaggregated data exhibits mixed results: Loan approval rate is fairly distributed across genders, but loan size is biased in favor of male clients. Moreover, the theoretical prediction that women with larger projects receive proportionally smaller loans is conrmed.
This glass ceiling eect is robust to econometric specication.
Importantly, this paper raises serious doubts about two assumptions commonly made in empirical micronance papers. First, the gender dummy is not an appropriate proxy for poverty level for at least two reasons: 1) it mixes poverty and potential bias, and 2) women tend to ask for smaller loans than men with similar characteristics. Second, average loan size is an unsatisfactory assessment tool for the MFIs' social mission. On top of being abusively penalizing for cross-subsidization (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009 ), average loan size might indeed be articially reduced by biased treatment of some clientele segments. Therefore, we favor the use of outreach, preferably weighted by some gender-insensitive indicator of the clients' poverty level.
This paper also shows that the glass ceiling eect is present whatever the credit ocer's gender. Therefore, our ndings do not support the gender anity hypothesis in the spirit of the cultural anity theory tested for in mortgage lending (Hunter and Walker, 1996; Bostic, 2003) .
Understanding why female and male ocers adopt diverging screening methodologies goes beyond the scope of this paper, but psychological factors linked to business risk perception are likely involved (Borghans et al., 2009) . Such factors could also explain why female applicants request smaller loans than their male counterparts with similar characteristics. Alternatively, female borrowers could refrain from requesting loans that would put at risk their nancial situation within household. Such a rationale would be in line with the ndings that microcredit increases the women's nancial vulnerability (Garikipati, 2008; ).
Gender stereotyping has been observed in a wide variety of situations in developed countries, including small-business lending. It is thus no surprise that it also shows o in Brazil. Therefore, the fact that our results capture no gender gap in loan approval rate is remarkable, especially given persistent inequalities reported in denial rates in the US banking sector (Weller, 2009) .
Nevertheless, further studies are needed to check the robustness of our ndings on other MFIs, in particular the ones that claim to be committed to women and minority empowerment.
Further work should also assess the impact of gender on creditworthiness through a careful examination of default history (Ferguson and Peters, 1997) .
If women do indeed exhibit lower default rates, as often claimed by the micro-credit industry and conrmed by Marrez and Schmit (2009) who study a Moroccan MFI, then the presence of taste-based discrimination, as opposed to prot-based statistical discrimination, would become undeniable. As pointed out by Ladd (1998) , very little information exists on default rates. Therefore, we strongly encourage regulators, donors, and other recommendation issuers to request the release of detailed data from the MFIs.
Viewed through the women empowerment lens, our results are consistent with two dominant, but seemingly contradictory, features found in the literature.
On the one hand, as far as access to credit is concerned, women are treated on the same grounds as men. Therefore, microcredit does indeed oer unexplored opportunities to female entrepreneurs. But on the other hand, women keep facing harsher conditions than men regarding not only their social and familial statuses, but also their borrowing possibilities. In that perspective, our results extend to credit conditions the mitigated conclusions on women empowerment reached by Kabeer (2001) .
Furthermore, as small loans are known to be less protable (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) , the number of women beneting from microcredit could progressively decline in prot-oriented MFIs (Cull et al., 2006) . In that line, our results conrm the ndings by, e.g., Johnson (2004) and Corsi et al. (2006) that a gender-sensitive approach makes sense in the micronance industry.
Lastly, the scope of this paper goes beyond microcredit and gender issues. Actually, our model is applicable to any kind of taste-based discrimination in lending. The current literature is mostly focused on denial (or approval) rate.
We show that examining loan size may reveal insightful as well. Getting a required loan is good news for an entrepreneur, but when it comes to investing it for business purposes, the loan size matters more.
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Appendix A Descriptive Statistics by Credit Ofcer's Gender For tiny requests (below the mean), the gender gap attributable to male ocers does not increase with respect to project scale. The interaction term between the client's gender and the requested amount is indeed not signicant.
Surprisingly, the corresponding female ocers' regression exhibits a negative gender dummy coecient, but a positive interaction term coecient. This means that, for the tiny requests, the loan size proposed to women by female ocers increases with respect to the requested amount, but with a constant handicap. Thus, female credit ocers partially compensate the female borrowers' gap (that they create), but only for low-medium requests (i.e., the highest tiny requests). For small requests (above the mean), the opposite is observed. For all ocers, the gender dummy is positive, but more than compensated by a negative interaction term. Female ocers are especially penalizing to the female applicants introducing the highest requests.
In summary, the results conrm the presence of a glass ceiling but highlight the non linearity of the relationship between requested amount and loan size. This is likely due to the fact that requests are not objective data like the applicant's personal characteristics. Indeed, the requested amount may result from a strategic behavior from the applicant. Manipulating tiny requests is often pointless, but the stake becomes more meaningful for more ambitious applicants. If this argument holds, then the results would mean that female applicants with higher requests lack credibility in front of all credit ocers, and especially female ones.
